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Latin America Report

(FOUO 12/79)

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LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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ARGENTINA

VIDELA'S TRIP TO JAPAN TERMED DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 21 Oct 79 pp 12-13

[Article by Eduardo J. Paredes: "A Presidential Trip to Be Considered and a Critical Opening"]

[Text] President Videla has by now been engaged again in the complete exercise of his functions for several days, following his trip to Japan. And it is time to tell the reader that, insofar as foreign policy is concerned, "nothing is either true or false," and often everything depends on the tone, etc. There were some who, eager to anticipate better results for the nation, expected to see Lt General Videla arrive with a fine package of advantageous business deals under his arm; and this was not the case. From that pragmatic standpoint, which simultaneously reveals a complete lack of understanding about the Japanese style in international transactions, the trip may have appeared to be a failure. Actually, if one regards the event in its true dimensions and correctly notes the guidelines involved in its development, the criticism is not fair and the results are quite satisfactory.

In the first place, many have forgotten that it was Japan which showed an interest in promoting an official, practical rapprochement with Argentina through an invitation handled on the level of the respective foreign ministries. This was an invitation which Argentina could not disdain because, since there are many countries which have been waiting for years for a positive wink from the land of slanted eyes, being selected as an esteemed interlocutor by one of the world's great powers has eradicated all the images indicating a lack of stability and reliability with respect to our commitments, which we unfortunately had. But, on the other hand, at a time when the country's international relations are beset with problems, it was essential from a political standpoint that the Western powers observe a rapprochement with Japan, no less, fostered by the latter's interest and not by a mournful plea from Buenos Aires.

So, when analyzed from a political standpoint, the rapprochement with Japan and the joint document quite deliberately favoring the initiation of a strong bilateral economic relationship are a success. When viewed from a purely economic angle, it may have dashed hopes if the sectors expected to see Videla arrive like a kind of Santa Claus, carrying the traditional bag filled with

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investments and loans. In the first place, Japan is not a country readily disposed toward making foreign investments, and it has always preferred to grant loans for the purpose of marketing its own products outside of the archipelago. Argentina needs investments more than it needs loans steered in a certain direction. Then the conclusion was reached that the president made the trip in search of an agreement on rapprochement for a future bilateral economic association, which was achieved. There were some who made the criticism that the president's figure was used to begin negotiations, instead of to be a signatory thereof. But, actually, many factors would have to be placed on the scale to understand why the compromise that was used was accepted. First of all, the president was not going to deal with Japanese industrialists, but was rather on an absolutely equal footing with the Japanese prime minister insofar as rank was concerned, and went at the special invitation of the emperor. Secondly, in view of the Japanese deference in seeking a direct rapprochement with Argentina, it was not a matter of embarking on the area of protocolar subtleties.

The various newspaper articles showed that Japan was particularly interested in negotiating two loan plans for projects using Japanese technology in the country: the electrification of the Roca railroad branch, and the industrial expansion of the SOMISA [Argentine Joint Iron-and-Steel Association] steel plant. The trip made it possible for both projects to be included on a general agenda, which also included the possibility of developing telecommunications technology and fishing operations. But it is important to stress the fact that Japan began to hint at a slight, but real interest in investing, so long as Argentina is in a position to guarantee stability in all aspects of the bilateral pact, and a capacity for being for Japan a good market for food and even oil supplies, insofar as technology and good fortune can help us to raise our production to the point where we might have exportable surpluses.

To put it briefly, we Argentines are constantly embroiled in easy criticism. We either say "nothing has happened here," if there is immobility in a ruler, or we say "he finally went and nothing happened," if the ruler ceases his immobility and tries to make up for decades of backwardness. Objectively, we can only state that the president's trip to Japan was important from a political standpoint, we can cautiously term it positive from an economic standpoint and we can say that it was really positive from a diplomatic standpoint. Japan winked one of its slanted eyes and, with the speed of the indescribable pool game played by our fellow countrymen, Argentina managed to respond to the sign. Now it will have to wait for the progress of the negotiations to learn whether the assumption that, at a time when the international situation is quite difficult, we have succeeded in arranging future activity with a partner by no means to be underestimated: the third-ranking power in the world, will become a reality.

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And What About China?

Yes, it is possible that the president may travel to China also. For some time, since the early 1960's, the vast country of the Orient has been seeking in the Southern Cone of America the great opportunities for purchasing food for 1 billion Chinese, in a country wherein even the daily use of manure is planned, and on the day when that planning fails, the entire structure collapses. A billion people in a socialist planning system pose a rather serious problem. The Chinese realize this and are preparing for an era in which the standard of living of its inhabitants will be improved and there will be a breakthrough toward an economy with greater consumption. Moreover, China does not make its business dealings an ideological problem, because it does not offer exchanges with cultural roots, but merely business. And it pays far more punctually than other countries which gorge themselves talking about capitalism. There are American Sinologists who claim that China is socialist inside and overtly capitalist outside; while simultaneously maintaining that its strongly nationalistic quality separates it from the internationalist concepts of proletarian revolutions. Furthermore, China has serious historical problems, past and present, and involving borders and culture, with the other communist giant, the Soviet Union; and hence it must necessarily look to the West in the search for absolutely necessary openings which have little to do with ideology.

If we manage to increase our productivity, we could sell good quality food and industrial products to the Chinese at a good price and without obligation (as the pen sellers on the collectives say). Argentina should widen its commercial and international view without any inhibitions (as, it is only fair to admit, the Radical movement tried to do, with serious internal problems, between 1963 and 1965); and if, for this purpose, Lt General Videla should have to travel to Peking, it would be a good opportunity for us to put an end to our prejudices, and let things take their course....

And Foreign Relations?

They are bad, thank you. Everything that we have been analyzing is directly related to a changing Western world wherein Argentina's status again has the Kafka-like odd quality that has marked it since the end of World War II. When the West was governed by the right wing, we were center liberals; when they began to try neoliberalism, we were enthusiastic populists and corporativists. Now, when the vast majority of them are democratic socialists, we have a right wing government. But, although this is an important and almost serious matter, we should not despair; because in today's world, calling something right or left is merely a game of semantics. The important thing is to determine the individual's role in society, and to gear the political and economic system to that humanistic criterion. The overall situation is negative: The United States has a bad opinion of us, and the European Parliament's view is even worse. Latin America, with but few exceptions, is in a state of upheaval in search of democracy; and the Vatican is affectionately pulling our ears now and then (rightfully, at best). We are a truly Western, Christian country, which has, paradoxically, been criticized by the West and the Church.

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It would be ridiculous to claim that we must continue with blinders on, waiting for the European social democrats and the North Americans to shift to the right, and for Monsignor Lefebvre to be the one to apply the Council of Trent rite to the Vatican's rules.

It is obvious that, without losing our national essence, and without losing the great store of ideas that have shaped the nation (and note that all the historical eras, all of them, have had their significance in that shaping), it is Argentina which must adapt to the world in which it has to live, and it must not feel that it is sufficiently mighty to expect the world to change. We Argentines are well aware of the fact that the process of national reorganization is not a dictatorship. But we are also well aware that it is not the vanguard political system in the Western world. We are, through our own fault, slightly against the grain of history. So, it is impossible to neglect the future effort to attain an agreement on national unity which will be aimed at a democratic system, with complete justice and development for the individual, so that the international community will admit us into its midst.

Perhaps there is no need to accelerate the deadlines, but we must hasten the period leading to structural changes and the transformation of a mediocre, weary society into a creative, vigorous society. In the days ahead, this process has a possibility of beginning to speak a political language through a proposal which must inevitably contain two unavoidable premises: it must be directed at the nation's social reality, and also at the international reality wherein the nation is developing.

The international thermometer indicates three important temperatures for the country: below zero in Europe, cold in the United States and a slight sign of spring in the Vatican. We shall unquestionably have to devise a domestic policy which, although it does not necessarily have to make us the ideological partners of anyone against our will, at least will not doom us to having anyone as enemies; because no one could seriously imagine an axis consisting of Buenos Aires, Asuncion, Montevideo and Capetown against the rest of the world. Not even Menotti would make us win that game.

Moreover, Argentina has a cultural obligation to join in the evolution of the West, and is prevented from becoming separated therefrom. Even in many of the aspects for which it is currently being criticized, it is possible that the judgment of history which will eventually prove it right is not far off. But, by the same token, there is no reason to lose sight of either our own cultural roots nor those bequeathed to us by Europe; because we cannot end up in an odd state of fraternization with the Ivory Coast, and withdraw our ambassadors from the great political centers of the West. Argentina must "act in the forefront."

And Inflation?

Dr Martinez de Hoz said "from 3 to 5 years." We are at the end of the fourth. God willing, there are two possibilities: either he is not mistaken or, in case he is, he will apply his indisputable magnanimity as a man of honor and admit it before it is too late. This inflation is very severe; it corrupts; it is another enemy, of everyone.

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ARGENTINA

PANDOLFI REFLECTS ON ARMED FORCES OBJECTIVES, MEANS

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 22 Oct 79 p 7

[Article by Rodolfo Pandolfi: "Means and Goals in the Present Political Period"]

[Text] Any assessment of the situation that exists under the present circumstances entails the necessary and dynamic correlation between the intentions of the leaders of the process and the response from the real facts existing apart from the process that is under way (which does not necessarily imply an opposing intention).

The intention is at all times gaged by relating it to the main factors which are operating in the same context:

a. International political factor; b. international economic factor; c. international financial factor; d. international cultural factor; e. national political factor; f. national economic factor; g. national financial factor; h. national social factor.

Added to those factors, which are not necessarily the most important ones, are all the visible subcategories (the effect of the regional political factor on the present period) and, of course, many others (attitude of the Catholic Church, effect of the passage of time itself on the population's expectations, etc.).

The essential idea that will underly the Armed Forces' political proposal is the establishment of an efficient, stable democracy founded upon a system of political parties and representation through the parliamentary institution. Hence, in the last analysis the objective is compliance with the National Constitution.

Gradualism

In order to attain that objective, those leading the current process prefer the gradualist method and, one may assume, the so-called informed gradualist

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method (in other words, communicating with the citizenry regarding the completion of the respective stages).

However, it is obvious that the incorporation of the gradualist method affords some variations. The first "step" might be on the municipal, parliamentary or provincial level. There are several possibilities in this respect. Any method that might be chosen inevitably offers both advantages and disadvantages. In any event, one consideration should be taken into account: It would not appear easy to complete all the steps during an interval exceeding the period of the mandates themselves.

For example (based on one of the draft bills that have been disseminated), it might be assumed that the first step would consist of normalization of the provinces. That step would be carried out on the basis of substages, leading to the normalization of provinces "in turns." However, the device would become complicated if it entailed a change in officials before the cycle had concluded. For example, if each provincial governor remains in office for 4 years, the fact that the other one has chosen his course of action for the first time produces a special situation.

The other problem posed by the steps is the possibility of politicizing areas which should not necessarily be subject to politicization. The most recurrent objection that has been made to the starting of normalization in the small and medium-sized municipalities is that either this period does not represent embarking on a political path, or else it leads to a communal hyper-politicization.

To be sure, the opposite course of action (calling for simultaneous elections at a given time) also poses serious obstacles, and could lead to a serious discrepancy in time between the goals sought (a stable democracy) and the results accrued. Establishing an overall contest at one and the same time would lead to a polarization which would detract viability from the understandings between the civilian and the military sectors.

Another Problem

The question might be this: The beginning of institutional normalization over a very extensive period of time could result in a political hyper-polarization that would deprive the center of space. The suspension of the parties itself, while productive and trade union activity pursues its course, becomes dangerous in this regard. At the same time, a normalization "in just a single turn" would also lead to polarization. Perhaps the method should be sought in a medium term, with phases of completion covering intermediate intervals.

But the government (any government) is far removed from being an absolute creator of reality, and all ideas must necessarily be geared in some measure to the course of events. No one can govern in a vacuum.

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Over and above methodological problems, there remains to be resolved the matter of the goals which have been proposed, as to whether the gradualism or the simultaneous consultations should have specific purposes. What is the future government which is desired, and what values are we seeking to preserve?

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ARGENTINA

BRIEFS

LEFTWARD DRIFT SIGNALED--Argentina is drawing closer to the Soviet bloc. A frigate of the Argentine Naval Academy anchored in the Leningrad roadstead in September, and Soviet engineers will be working on hydroelectric powerplant construction in the Argentinian back-country. Polish fishing ships are operating off the Patagonia coast, and the Czechs are to provide Buenos Aires with a new sewer system. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 15 Oct 79 p 43]

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CUBA

SOVIET WRITER ON CUBA'S VANGUARD ROLE IN NONALINED MEETING

Moscow AMERICA LATINA in Spanish No 3, 1979 pp 22-31

[Commentary by Leonid Levchenko]

[Text] In September the sixth summit conference of nonaligned countries will be held in Havana. The fact that the members of the movement have selected the Cuban capital as the site of their latest top-level meeting is further evidence of the increasing interaction of the nonaligned countries and the socialist community, of which Cuba is a member, in the struggle against imperialism, for peace and for social progress. Moreover, that choice provides additional proof of the unquestioned consolidation of Cuba's role as one of the movement's leaders, as a country that takes principled anti-imperialist and anticolonialist positions and gives as much support as possible to the peoples' national liberation struggle.

At a ceremony honoring the 25th anniversary of the heroic attack on the Moncada Barracks, Fidel Castro said, "Cuba is a nonaligned country because it is not a party to any military pact; but it is definitely against reaction, imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, fascism, racism, zionism, unequal relationships and the exploitation of the underdeveloped peoples. Cuba resolutely supports liberation movements, just causes and progressive groups throughout the world, primary objectives for which the nonaligned movement was created."¹ The Republic of Cuba has been a member of the movement since its creation. Thus, at the first conference, held in Belgrade, the Cuban delegation was instrumental in the drafting of documents of an anti-imperialist nature. Thanks to its efforts in particular, the Belgrade meeting's final statement ("Declaration by the Chiefs of State and Heads of Governments of the Nonaligned Countries") directly linked the maintenance of a lasting peace to the need for "colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism to be exterminated in all their manifestations." The participants in the conference expressed the opinion of all those who favor progress on our planet when they said, "War among the peoples is not only an anachronism but also a crime committed by warped people." The delegates declared that "peaceful coexistence among the peoples . . . is an indispensable condition of their liberty and progress," and they acknowledged the principles of peaceful coexistence as "the only basis for all international relationships."

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In keeping with Cuba's proposals, the final declaration contained a statement that "the member countries consider the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases on states' territory, especially against their expressed will, a serious violation of their sovereignty. Moreover, they proclaimed their "unlimited support of countries wishing to eliminate these bases." The declaration also said, "The presence of the American military base at Guantanamo (Cuba), which is opposed by the government and the people of Cuba, violates that country's sovereignty and territorial integrity."²

The newspaper GRANMA said, when commenting on the statements approved at Belgrade, "In September 1961, those attending the first summit conference of nonaligned countries . . . drafted a final declaration in which they acknowledged the expanding role of Latin America, and particularly of Cuba, in the struggle against imperialism and for world peace. One of the principles affirmed in it was to respect the right of Cuba and of all peoples to freely choose their political and social system. . . . The support and solidarity received by our country assured it, in time, the role of initiator of a movement that would advance the rights of the Latin American peoples to speak with their own voices on the world stage."³

Cuba was the first Latin American country to join the young Movement of Nonaligned Countries. It later came to occupy a leading position in it and marked the trail for other peoples of the region who were seeking, and still are seeking, in the movement support for their anti-imperialist struggle for independence, especially with respect to U.S. imperialism.

At the second conference, held in Cairo, Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, president of Cuba, stressed that his country's foreign policy was directed toward the strengthening of peaceful coexistence and that the Cuban Government considers peace indivisible. The Cuban head of government again spoke in favor of the dismantling of foreign military bases and called upon member countries to confirm the Belgrade resolution demanding that the United States return the occupied territory at Guantanamo to the Cubans and remove its troops. Dorticos stated that his country opposes racial discrimination, and he proposed that the nonaligned chiefs of state support British Guiana's and Puerto Rico's right to be independent.⁴

Declarations approved at that conference also condemned the United States' illegitimate occupation of the base at Guantanamo and the economic and commercial blockade of the island. At Cuba's urging, the delegates censured the attempts "by colonialists and neocolonialists in Latin America to infringe the rights to self-determination and independence of the peoples of that region."⁵

The results of the Cairo conference were highly praised in the Soviet-Cuban joint communique concerning Dorticos' visit to the Soviet Union, which took place after the international gathering. The communique said, "The second conference of the chiefs of state and heads of government of the nonaligned countries, in which Cuba participated, was a major international event. . . .

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The Soviets believe that the actions at this conference of the Cuban delegation, led by President Dorticos, effectively contributed to its positive results. They believe, moreover, that the conference resolutions concerning Cuba strengthen its international standing and confirm once more the Cuban people's right to continue invigorating and developing their freely chosen social system."⁶

As the prestige of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries rose and its ranks swelled, the imperialists intensified and refined their efforts to undermine the movement from within, taking advantage of its sociopolitical heterogeneity and the discord and conflicts among its members. Besides disparaging the movement's progressive political principles, they attempted to turn its members against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

At the fourth conference of the chiefs of state and heads of government of the nonaligned countries, held in Algiers, there was a massive effort to turn the movement against its natural ally, the socialist community. The imperialist enemies of nonalignment substituted--this is their typical method of carrying out propaganda--false principles for the movement's initial authentic principles, imposing on it the tendency of the "poor" to live at the expense of the "rich," unconditional neutralism and even isolationism, the balance between the "superpowers" and the desire to obtain concessions from one or another by bargaining. The purpose of those propagandistic actions is to weaken the movement's anti-imperialist content.

Such maneuvers, accompanied by the attempt to ascribe "imperialistic intentions" to the Soviet Union based on the pretext of its "excessive" economic and military power and its "too active" international politics, did not go unanswered at the conference. Fidel Castro gave the firmest response to the enemies of nonalignment. "Any effort to place the nonaligned countries in opposition to the socialist camp," he said, "is profoundly counterrevolutionary and solely and exclusively benefits imperialist interests. There can be only one reason for inventing a false enemy: to avoid the true enemy."⁷ Fidel Castro unequivocally answered the question of what principle has priority for the socialist state: nonalignment and proletarian internationalism. "I want to recall," he said, "the fact that Cuba is a socialist, Marxist-Leninist country whose ultimate goal is communism. We are proud of this! Working from this conception of human society, we determine our national and international policies. Above all, we are faithful to the principles of international proletarianism. . . . For us, the world is divided into capitalist countries and socialist countries, imperialist countries and progressive countries; in short, governments that support imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and racism, and governments that are opposed to imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and racism. To us, this is basic to the issue of alignment, for nothing wholly exempts us from the fundamental obligation to energetically remedy the crimes that have been committed and are being committed against humanity."⁸

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Owing in large measure to the stance taken by the Cuban delegation, the Algiers conference witnessed the failure of those who sought to impose upon the nonaligned countries ideas that were inconsistent with the interests and objectives of the movement and that would tend to separate its members from the states in the socialist community.

The principles set forth by Fidel Castro at the conference itself determine the country's political line within the nonaligned movement. The Cuban communists' highest body ratified those principles when it affirmed that henceforth Cuba would also belong to that movement, in keeping with the tasks proposed by Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party and Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba, in the speech he delivered at the fourth conference of nonaligned countries (Algiers, 1973), in order to achieve unity within the movement and strengthen its bonds with its historic allies, the countries of the socialist community.⁹

Cuba contributed substantially to the development of the concept of non-alignment in the realm of foreign policy and has made a valuable contribution to its practical application. By pursuing a genuinely internationalist policy, that country is fighting to consolidate the movement's anti-imperialist orientation and resisting efforts to give it a "neutralist" character. It convinces other nonaligned states that, given the irreversible change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism, it is impossible to solve the movement's principal problems without unity with those carrying on a consistent anti-imperialist struggle, especially with the socialist states. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party and vice president of the Councils of State and Ministers, told reporters in Belgrade in July 1978 that nonalignment does not mean, either for Cuba or for any other nonaligned country, neutrality and failure to become involved in the serious issues related to the fight against war and to the support of liberation movements. What is important to Cuba is that the group of nonaligned countries constitutes a community of states having different social and political systems and belonging to different socioeconomic systems but not belonging to any of the military blocs and accepting the movement's program. Cuba, C. R. Rodriguez noted, fully meets those criteria. Speaking of Cuba's position regarding the issue of military blocs, he stated that Cuba supports and completely agrees with the nonaligned countries' point of view; that is, that the existence of blocs is a negative factor in the international situation and their elimination should be sought. That does not suggest, however, that they should be equated; on the contrary, a careful distinction must be made between them. For example, the Warsaw Treaty arose from the need for defense against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an aggressive imperialist bloc. Furthermore, he went on, the military alliance of capitalist countries rests on the principle of aggression, expansionism, intervention and threats.

Cuba's actions as a member of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries, which benefit the common struggle of the peoples against imperialism, colonialism and racism, have won widespread international recognition. That country's

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line, which is consistent and faithful to principles in its foreign policy, has insured the rapid rise of its international prestige and the continuous expansion of its international bonds. The Isle of Liberty offers an example of the truly revolutionary and internationalist policy of a socialist country.

This was also confirmed by the fifth conference of the chiefs of state and heads of government of the nonaligned countries, which was held in Colombo. That gathering which was most representative of the movement was attended by leaders from 86 states that were full members of the movement and by delegates from 22 countries, international organizations and national liberation movements present as observers, as well as by invited representatives of 7 countries. The composition of that conference reflected the marked increase in the nonaligned movement's prestige and power, due largely to the relaxation of international tensions that resulted from the shift of the balance of forces in favor of peace, national liberation and socialism.

On the eve of the conference and after it began, the imperialists and their allies tried once again to eliminate the anti-imperialist essence of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries, to weaken it and to separate it from other progressive groups. Some in effect called for revision of the previously developed criteria that determine whether one or another country may belong to the movement. Along with the imperialists, Peking's leaders intensified their subversive activity, anxious to bring the nonaligned movement under their influence and place it at the service of their jingoist hegemonic aspirations. Pretending to be "friends" of the movement, Peking's emissaries attempted to "mold" some countries and hurled false charges about the foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist countries, particularly Cuba and Vietnam, which also is among the most active members of the movement.

With respect to Cuba, the Maoists launched a furious propaganda campaign in common with the imperialists, especially regarding the events in Angola. The efforts to prove the "illicit" nature of Cuba's conduct in the international turned out to be completely fruitless. "The charges that in reality Cuba is not a nonaligned country, that the Cubans are the troops of communist intervention in Africa, etc."--we are quoting the newspaper GRANMA--"do not succeed in obscuring the truth of the actions undertaken by Cuba in support of the just cause of the liberation and independence of the peoples, set forth in all declarations by the movement and specifically mentioned in the "Political Declaration of the Fifth Summit Conference . . . " which praises "the Republic of Cuba and other states that helped the people of Angola to frustrate the expansionist and colonialist strategy of South Africa's racist regime and its allies."¹⁰

The Colombo conference was the occasion of a great political victory for Cuba. The delegates acknowledged Cuba's significant role in the nonaligned movement and agreed to hold their next summit meeting in Havana.

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That decision clearly displeased the imperialists, the leaders in Beijing and other reactionary groups. On the eve of the conference in Belgrade of foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries (July 1978), Washington and Beijing, publicly cast doubt on the suitability of Cuba's and Vietnam's membership in the Movement of Nonaligned Countries in order to accentuate the movement's internal contradictions and to ruin the conference planned for Havana. The attempts to lead the movement along the road of active anticommunism continued at the Belgrade meeting itself. For example, the representatives of Somalia, Zaire, Egypt and other states tried to censure the internationalist aid given by Cuba and other socialist countries to the peoples of Africa who are fighting for their liberty and independence. Some proposed that the sixth summit conference not be held in Havana. In this last instance, varied expression was given to the idea, advanced by U.S. President James Carter, that the conference would contribute to radicalization of the movement, to its deviation from stated objectives and its submission to the policies of the socialist countries.

However, those efforts were a notable failure. If the imperialists, the provocators in Peking and other reactionary groups had succeeded in fomenting a crisis within the nonaligned movement, the countries most seriously harmed by that would not have been Cuba or Vietnam, but rather those that hoped to find in the movement effective support for their struggle against imperialism and for economic and political rights. The Belgrade meeting confirmed, as expected, the plans to hold the summit meeting in Havana in September 1979 and, in keeping with the established tradition, Cuba's role as coordinator of the movement during the period 1979-1982; that is, until the next meeting.

GRANMA said this about the decision: "The justness of Cuba's internationalist policy concerning Angola and Ethiopia was ratified, and plans to hold the sixth summit in Havana were approved by consensus in the face of the isolated stance taken by Somalia, Zaire, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. No one has been able to deny the prestige attained by Cuba within and outside the Movement of Nonaligned Countries."¹¹

On the contrary, later events--especially China's aggression against Vietnam, begun on 17 February--revealed very clearly the true essence of Beijing's warlike, expansionist policy, directed, too, against nonaligned countries. As Isidoro Malmierca, Cuba's foreign minister, said in an interview with the newspaper IZVESTIYA, that aggression has profoundly alarmed all the countries belonging to the movement, all the more because Vietnam is its comrade in arms. Again--he said--we are witnesses to the jingoist, hegemonic appetite of Beijing, which has assumed the role of Trojan Horse for imperialism, is trying to divide the Movement of Nonaligned Countries and to hinder its growth.¹²

Thus, the sixth conference of the chiefs of state and heads of government of the nonaligned countries, meeting in Havana, will be a major event in international life. Profiting from the political prestige attained by

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that group of countries in the world arena, the Havana meeting will be able to give a reply to the provocative blackmail and pressure from the imperialist and Maoist forces and make a contribution to the noble cause of the continued easing of tension and the consolidation of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations and support for the peoples' liberation struggle.

FOOTNOTES

1. BOHEMIA, No 31, Havana, 1978, p 44.
2. El Movimiento de los Paises No Alineados en documentos y materiales [The Movement of Nonaligned Countries in Documents and Papers], Moscow, 1975, pp 65, 69-70.
3. GRANMA SEMANAL, 12 Nov 78, p 5.
4. PRAVDA, 9 Oct 64.
5. See El Movimiento de los Paises No Alineados en documentos y materiales, pp 90 and 95.
6. PRAVDA, 19 Oct 64.
7. Fidel Castro, "The Success and the Future of the Nonaligned Movement Will Lie in Its Not Letting Itself Be Infiltrated, Misled or Tricked by Imperialist Ideology," Havana, 1973, p 16.
8. Ibid., p 12.
9. Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba. Memorias [First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party. Reports], Vol 3, Havana, 1976, p 227.
10. GRANMA, 10 Jul 78.
11. GRANMA SEMANAL, 12 Nov 78, p 5.
12. IZVESTIYA, 21 Mar 79.

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CUBA

U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS QUESTION EXPLORED

Moscow AMERICA LATINA in Spanish No 3, 1979 pp 183-194

[Commentary by Piotr Litavrin]

[Text] It is widely known that during the mid-1970's certain changes in Cuban-American relations took place, particularly following the Democrats' accession to power in the United States. However, later events showed that the U.S. Government was not prepared to re-establish relations on a basis of equality and noninterference in its neighbor's internal affairs. Washington tried to condition normalization of relations on Cuba's withdrawal of aid to national liberation movements in Africa and attempted to impose on it a specious discussion of "human rights" and to meddle in its domestic policy. When these efforts failed and the American "rules of the game" were rejected, James Carter's government blamed Cuba for a lack of desire for "genuine normalization" and halted the evolution of relations with Havana. This turnabout was not unexpected. Normalization of relations with Cuba is a fairly complex, contradictory and painful process for those governing the United States, as is abandonment of traditional ideas and attitudes. Nonetheless, this process which is under way in Cuban-American relations evidences a fundamental evolution of opinion in U.S. governing circles regarding the issue of normalization of relations with its neighbor.

This issue arose when Washington instituted the economic and political blockade of the Isle of Liberty in hopes of bringing the Cuban people to their knees. It was already obvious to the most perceptive, realistic Americans that this blockade would seriously discredit the United States in the eyes of Latin America and the world.¹ There were, however, few who shared this point of view during the 1960's, when most American politicians and specialists were committed to the idea that Cuba had to be isolated. Even when American political analysts spoke favorably of the possibility of establishing contacts with Cuba, they conceived of it in terms that were wholly unacceptable to Cuba. For example, Mario Lazo wrote that relations between Cuba and the United States would be restored when the former rejoined the family of "free" countries.² Taking into account this terminology used in bourgeois publications, we can conclude that Lazo, like most

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of the other specialists, had not in fact analyzed the issue of normalization of relations with /socialist/ [in italics] Cuba.

It took 10 years of successful construction of socialism in Cuba, the growth of its international prestige and the marked failure of the blockade before those in the United States would begin to acknowledge reality with a more astute point of view.

A significant role in this was played by the easing of tension in international relations and the spreading throughout the world of the principles of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The expansion of U.S. relations with the USSR and other socialist states confronted advocates of the embargo with the following: Why can the U.S. Government establish contacts with the socialist countries overseas and not with Cuba, its neighboring socialist state? It is because of this that in American political and scientific circles there was a growing sense that the United States should put an end to its fruitless efforts to isolate Cuba diplomatically and economically.³ Furthermore, the very fact of isolation seemed questionable; for the Isle of Liberty was successfully developing relations with both the socialist states and many capitalist states, as well as Latin American ones. The blockade's failure was recognized more and more widely in the United States and often noted as an example of the unsuitability of a complete economic and political embargo as an instrument of foreign policy.⁴

The sharp edge of the increasing criticism in the United States was directed toward the government's position of ignoring the issue. The opinion that something had to be done with respect to Cuba spread among American political analysts, whereas official Washington remained immobile concerning the matter. M. Deutsch, the well-known expert on international relations, wrote, "The United States Government is maintaining a negative stance with respect to the Castro government, but there is no indication of a desire on our part to state what this government should do so that our negative sanctions against it will end."⁵ The progressive American historian M. Needler expressed a similar view on pointing out that Cuba's foreign policy is completely understandable and justifiable as a defensive reaction "against possible attack by the United States."⁶

Analysts also speak of the negative effect of the policy of nonrecognition on inter-American relations, for it aggravated the conflict between Washington and many of its "members" of the Organization of American States (OAS), who insisted that the embargo be lifted. Some experts have concluded that revision of this obsolete line is also necessary for the achievement of more general goals of U.S. foreign policy. For example, G. Lodge, a seasoned politician who held a responsible post in the Eisenhower administration, wrote that by resisting a change of course relative to Cuba and declaring itself in favor of maintaining the status quo in Latin America, the United States is falling behind in the competition introduced into Latin America by Cuba and the Soviet Union.⁷

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Despite the flood of books and articles about the "Cuban question," American political thought at the beginning of the 1970's was characterized by the absence of any real idea concerning normalization of relations with Havana. It is true that studies had already been carried out regarding the medium- and long-term solutions to the problem. In fact, an analysis financed by the Ford Foundation, the RAND Corporation and the University of California ended with a recommendation that at first proposed "lifting the embargo partially or completely and allowing Cuba to participate in the work of inter-American bodies." The objective of the U.S. policy was also expressed sufficiently explicitly: to make Cuba more independent of the USSR and to diversify its foreign political relationships. However, all in all, the prospects of the development of Cuban-American relations continued to be subject to Havana's "behavior," to its response to the American initiative.⁸ Thus, among the reasons for normalization already mentioned, there appeared in the political analysts' lucubrations another factor that induced them to speak in favor of alteration of the course that had failed, with the added peculiarity that in time they began to place it above the others.

At any rate, commentaries by opponents of the blockade of Cuba seven or eight years ago were largely critical and not constructive, not solely or primarily because there was no real basis for an easing of tension between the two countries, but rather because it depended on a decision by the government whether it was appropriate in principle to normalize relations with Havana. It should be borne in mind that, despite the growing criticism of the embargo policy by experts and the press, the official circles of that era not only denied the need for changes but also tried to directly demonstrate the "positive results" arising from the blockade of Cuba. In particular, at meetings of the subcommittee on foreign relations of the United States Senate, the then deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, R. Hurwitsch, argued that the embargo was useful because it forced Cuba to consume energy, money and human resources to solve domestic problems, which--he believed--reduced its subversive activity abroad.⁹ The White House often shared such "cold war" thoughts. The extremely hostile attitude toward Cuba of the then U.S. President Nixon is very well known, as are his friendly connections with Cuban emigrants in Florida.

With all this, the undeniable failure of the embargo policy forced those opposed to the development of relations with Havana to seek new arguments to shore up their position. On the one hand, they often promoted the view that the "Cuban question" was not so important that an immediate solution was necessary: "Cuba isn't China, and relations with it offer no political benefits."¹⁰ On the other hand, the terms for normalization being proposed were wholly unacceptable to any independent state. For example, the American expert R. Crassweller said, when analyzing the possibilities of modification of the U.S. policy, that although better relations may perhaps be established in the future between the United States and Cuba, it is unlikely that it will happen "as long as Fidel Castro has nearly all the power in his hands."¹¹

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The traditional argument of those opposed to normalization of relations with Cuba was the view that saw in Washington's disposition to tolerate Havana "an important sign of U.S. acquiescence in accepting ideological pluralism on the American continent," which inevitably meant that American leaders were admitting the possibility of the future appearance of socialist states in the Western Hemisphere.¹² In reality, such a step would lead to de facto rerunciation of "pan-Americanism," the "Monroe Doctrine" and the theory of "geographical determinism," and, finally, it could constitute a significant precedent for the United States' entire foreign policy. Naturally, it is not easy for those governing the United States to take a step of this sort. However, events have already demonstrated the inconsistency of the aforementioned doctrines and ideas. In criticizing the inability of American politicians to abandon traditional positions and the old ideological baggage, A. Lowenthal, a prominent American specialist in Latin American affairs, wrote, "Before worrying about preventing (in Latin America--author's note) the second Cuba, shouldn't we recognize the first one?"¹³

In the mid-1970's a new phase began in the development of American political thought concerning the issue of normalization of relations with Cuba. During this phase, the "Cuban question" was discussed in the OAS, that body rescinded sanctions for trading with Cuba, and there were changes in official Washington's position regarding that country. Finally, direct Cuban-American conversations and contacts were initiated. Moreover, there was a shift in U.S. public opinion concerning the issue. Whereas at the end of the 1960's and in the early 1970's only one-fourth of those polled favored normalization of relations with Havana, in 1974 over one-half were in favor of it, and later those in favor of normalization reached 60 percent, and it is interesting that a large portion of the remaining 40 percent had no opinion. As was acknowledged within the Senate in 1975, "Today only a very small minority of Americans--many of them for personal reasons--rejects the basic idea of normalizing relations with Cuba."¹⁴

It is natural that there have been fundamental changes in the stance taken by American politicians and experts regarding the "Cuban question." They are due in large measure to the increasing contacts taking place between the two countries, especially to the trips by Senators C. Pell, J. Javits and G. McGovern to Cuba and to the opportunity to directly experience the life of the Cuban people. Now the issue debated was no longer that of the "appropriateness of developing relations with Havana," but the difficulties blocking the road to normalization. As a result, it was only as a matter of form that American analysts and politicians could be divided into opponents and supporters of normalization with Havana. The extreme position of rejecting any contacts was occupied by only a handful of ultra-reactionaries who were aligned with right-wing Cuban emigrants. There had also been marked changes in emigrants' opinions concerning the issue of normalization of relations with Havana. Of course, there is no single view, for the emigrants split into various organizations which are often mutually antagonistic. Some (for example, "Brigade 2506") continue to

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occupy positions strongly opposed to Cuba and are prepared to carry out any sort of provocation to wreck the process of easing tension between Cuba and the United States, while others are beginning to express support for normalization of relations with the Isle of Liberty. In fact, in November 1978 six Cuban exile social organizations, led by J. Roblejo Lorie, a prominent figure, spoke in favor of continuing the dialog with Havana. In a letter to R. Carter, the president's wife, they asked that the blockade against Cuba be lifted and that commercial flights between the two countries be initiated. Furthermore, many second-generation Cuban exiles do not merely support recognition of Cuba but are also friends of the socialist republic.

Despite the obvious changes in American political thinking concerning the prospects for normalization of relations with Cuba, it cannot be said that there has been a sharp decline in the number of the island's enemies among American men of science and politicians. The placement of the "Cuban question" in the "order of the day" of U.S. policy simply brought its true objectives and intentions into sharp relief as never before.

There are now three currents of American political thinking regarding this issue.

The first is that of the most consistent supporters of the development of Cuban-American relations, who believe that the United States should take the first step in that direction, unconditionally lifting the blockade, and addressing legal issues only after that. This realistic point of view is entirely constructive because it is based on universally recognized standards of international law and coincides with the Cubans' sense of the basis on which the development of contacts should rest. This point of view is shared by a vast number of American politicians, public figures and scholars. Among them, the clearest position is that of the communists, who have always advocated the re-establishment and development of relations between Cuba and the United States on a basis of equality, mutual respect, sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. In expressing solidarity with the Cuban people's struggle, they believe that the normalization of contacts between Havana and Washington represents a success for those who love peace. Gus Hall, secretary general of the U.S. Communist Party, visited Cuba as the leader of a delegation of American communists, expressing his satisfaction with the increased possibilities that relations would be resumed between the two countries.

A prompt solution to the "Cuban question" is also called for by bourgeois students of Latin American problems J. Petras, M. Needler, A. Lowenthal, Congressman J. Bingham, an active analyst of the possibilities for development of relations with Cuba, and many others. Although there are significant differences of opinion among them regarding the situation and the contents of the normalization process, the group is characterized by a broad view of the problem and the desire to establish relations with Havana on a

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basis of equal rights. Statements by some representatives of this current are very radical at times, such as, for example, the one that "Cuba is the only modern society in Latin America,"¹⁵ and they even express a sense of guilt and responsibility for their country's actions with respect to Cuba. Most American political analysts of this stripe agree that re-establishment and development of relations with Cuba in the broadest spheres would benefit both parties, with the added aspect that "in the economic realm the United States and Cuba would gain equally, and in the political realm the United States would perhaps gain more," for it would cease being a large state "intimidating a small country."¹⁶

Of course, some politicians and analysts in this group try to justify the need for U.S. intervention in its neighbor's internal affairs, and they harbor plans to correct the Cuban Government's domestic and foreign policy for the benefit of U.S. imperialism. These, though, are surreptitious efforts.

The second group, perhaps larger and more amorphous, comprises those who in principle favor normalization but address the issue from a purely pragmatic perspective, focusing on the immediate advantages accruing to the United States if it expanded contacts with Havana. Some political analysts in this group advocate immediate elimination of the embargo, urging the government to "acknowledge the realities," to give evidence of good sense, and so forth. However, the essential difference between the two groups is that the second believes that the United States should maintain and expand relations with Cuba primarily in order to exert pressure on it. These experts and politicians frankly declare that their objective is to contribute to the diversification of Havana's foreign political ties and to weaken its relations with the USSR. For example, R. Fontaine, a well-known scholar connected with government circles, has written with total candor that the United States' long-term objective "can be nothing less than to eliminate the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba without having recourse to war, subversion or the embargo," and "to weaken its ties with Moscow."¹⁷ Although such arguments in favor of normalization of Cuban-American relations have been heard now for several years, it is today that U.S. political thinkers are considering them with increasing interest.

Although the first group favoring normalization of relations with Havana has a broader view of the issue, it understands the need for a relaxation of tension between the two countries so that general U.S. foreign policy tasks can be carried out and that country can attempt to adapt to the new world situation. The second group of experts and politicians is seeking only petty objectives. As a result, the entire process of expanding Cuban-American relations is subordinated to the matter of whether or not the United States can achieve these objectives and, concerning that, Cuba's reaction to the U.S. Government's actions. For this reason, these political analysts' initiatives and opinions fluctuate with events and are thus unstable. The Cuban Government had scarcely stated that it would not cede on issues relative to its competence and that it was prepared to develop

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relations with the United States only on the basis of the principles of equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs, when those experts and politicians attacked Havana with accusations and threats. Furthermore, it is not surprising. It should be noted that the ranks of those favoring normalization of relations with Cuba were hurriedly joined by a large number of those who until very recently had been opponents and even declared enemies of the Cuban people. They were aware of the lack of perspective in their position of ignoring reality and were anxious to accrue political capital. In the preface to a book of his, the American scholar R. Radosh noted with irony that those who during the 1960's justified the need to isolate Cuba now assert that relations with it must be developed immediately.¹⁸ Moreover, in 1977, when favorable conditions were created for the development of relations between Havana and Washington, they urged the administration to be more flexible. It is symptomatic that the report by a group of experts that traveled to Cuba in February of that year stated that the United States should take steps without delay to normalize Cuban-American relations, for in time "Cuba's ability to respond to U.S. initiatives and make concessions (sic!--author's note) could diminish."¹⁹ Unfortunately, the views of this group of political analysts coincide in many ways with those of a large number of top American officials, including Z. Brzezinski, who is seeking the solution to the "Cuban question" only in terms of the battle against communism.

They are unable to understand the absurdity and lack of perspective of the view that assigns Cuba the role of satellite of one of the "superpowers," and the status of a sort of "coin of exchange" in the solution of global problems.²⁰

This attitude, when an independent state knowingly places itself in a position of inequality and does not consider itself a sovereign partner in a dialog, is a general characteristic of the course of U.S. foreign policy, particularly when dealing with problems involving small countries. Hence American political analysts' desire to condition development of relations with Havana on concessions by it; they want "proof" that Cuba "is prepared" to sacrifice some of its principles and interests for the sake of warmer relations with the United States.

In this order of things, it must be noted that, as shown by the history of Soviet-American relations and of U.S. relations with the other socialist countries, these proposals have always characterized the American stance. It is obvious that in the future there will be no lack, either, of attempts to "influence" socialist states, but their inanity will be readily apparent.

One part of this group of analysts tries at times to address the solution to the "Cuban question" in an "impartial" spirit, scrupulously weighing all the pros and cons. They are seeking an "objective answer" to the question of whether the United States would find it useful to develop relations with its neighbor. They calculate the volume of potential exchange between the two

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countries, and they study the possible effect on Havana of the means at Washington's disposal. In drawing up the balance, they sometimes pair off such factors as the need to enhance U.S. prestige in Latin America and around the world by re-establishing relations with Cuba with the fear that this step would irritate counterrevolutionary Cuban exiles in Florida.²¹ Usually, a more or less conscientious analysis of the situation leads the pragmatic American observers to acknowledge the necessity of normalizing relations and of the U.S. Government's adopting more energetic measures in that direction. The noted analyst of U.S. Latin American policy J. Dominguez, a native of Cuba and a naturalized American citizen, emphasized that only a revision of policy in several spheres would constitute a step forward, one that should begin with the lifting of the embargo.²²

The principal error committed by the second group of political analysts lies in their failure to take into account the following fact as a principle: Normalization of relations with Cuba should not be considered a concession made by the Americans; and the wisdom of it rests still less in the "need to influence" the Cuban Government. As G. McGovern pointed out in his report on the trip to Cuba in May 1975, the United States also needs the re-establishment and expansion of relations with the Republic of Cuba, for the previous policy "undermines confidence in our common sense."²³ It seems as if most American political analysts should even understand that.

At the same time, in American academic and political circles there are many people who must still be categorized as opponents of normalization of Cuban-American relations, although now they often try to deny this unconditioned judgment. Without totally rejecting the idea of expanding contacts with the Isle of Liberty, they set up so many conditions that it is essentially impossible to talk about normalization. They even greeted the recent limited contacts between the two countries and a certain inclination on the part of the Carter administration to expand relations with its neighbor with bared fangs. Senate R. Dole, in particular, blamed the White House for "encouraging Cuban intervention in Africa" and declared: "Our officials should insist on certain conditions before any consideration is given to normalization of relations."²⁴

By "conditions" advocates of the "hard line" mean, above all, the need for Cuba to pay for the nationalized property of U.S. firms. The Cuban Government--as their argument goes--will lose any reason for considering the issue if it resumes diplomatic relations with the United States and has access to American goods. It is also demanded that "political prisoners" in Cuba be freed and that its domestic policies be modified. Conditions of this sort are insisted upon deliberately, for their unacceptability to Cuba, as to any sovereign state, is evident in all regards. Nor is there a lack of American political analysts who decry the solution to the "Cuban question" for ideological reasons. Most often they are old professors immersed in the ideas of the "cold war" era and too far behind the times to be able to change their views, or they are experts and politicians closely linked with counterrevolutionary emigrants and full of hate toward the

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first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere. For example, L. McDonald, a democrat and a member of the House of Representatives, declared that by continuing the embargo the United States is hampering Cuba's aggressive plans in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, in his opinion, normalization of relations with Fidel Castro . . . would bring financial benefits to the Cuban regime and enable it to spread terrorism and subversion in Latin America.²⁵

Summing up the reasoning of American political analysts concerning the issue of normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba, we reach the following conclusion. In the last decade, most of them adopted more realistic positions whose common characteristic is recognition of the need for a prompt solution to the "Cuban question." At the same time, American political thinkers have not stopped seeking means of fighting revolutionary Cuba in order to undermine the foundations of socialism on the Isle of Liberty. However, Cuba's 20 years of independent existence and the era of struggle, against both armed aggression and ideological subversion and American pressure, have demonstrated the futility of the imperialists' efforts.

FOOTNOTES

1. See John Gerassi, "The Great Fear in Latin America," New York & London, 1963.
2. Mario Lazo, "American Policy Failure in Cuba, Dagger in the Heart," New York, 1968, p 417.
3. See "U.S. Caribbean Policy. Part I. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93d Congress, 2d Session," Washington, 1974, p 7.
4. See WORLD POLITICS, Vol 25, No 3, Princeton, 1973, p 413.
5. Morton Deutsch, "The Resolution of Conflict," Yale, 1973, p 136.
6. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No 2, New York, 1974, p 224.
7. See George C. Lodge, "Engines of Change. U.S. Interests and Revolution in Latin America," New York, 1970, p 321.
8. See Edward Gonzalez, "Partners in Deadlock. The U.S. and Castro, 1950-1971," New York, 1972, p 35.
9. See "United States Policy Towards Cuba. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92d Congress, 1st Session," Washington, 16 September 1971, pp 4-5.

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10. "The Americas in a Changing World," New York, 1975, p 117.
11. See Robert D. Crassweller, "The Caribbean Community. Changing Societies and U.S. Policy," New York, Washington, London, 1972, p 383.
12. William Watts, Jorge I. Dominguez, "A Policy Perspective. The United States and Cuba: Old Issues and New Directions," Washington, 1977, p 45.
13. "U.S. Caribbean Policy. Part I. Hearings". . . , p 6.
14. "Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session," Washington, 1975, p 123.
15. THE NATION, Vol 224, No 9, New York, 1977, p 273.
16. CURRENT HISTORY, Vol 74, No 434, Philadelphia, 1978, pp 85-86.
17. Rodger W. Fontaine, "On Negotiating With Cuba," Washington, 1975, pp 84-85.
18. R. Radosh, "The New Cuba. Paradoxes and Potentials," New York, 1976, p 17.
19. "Toward Improved United States-Cuba Relations, Report of a Special Study Mission to Cuba, February 10-15, 1977," Washington, 1977, p 21.
20. Fontaine, op. cit., p 99.
21. "The Americas in a Changing World," p 119.
22. Ibid., p 125.
23. George S. McGovern, "Cuban Realities: May 1975," Washington, 1975, p 1.
24. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, Vol 57, No 2, Washington, 1978, p 45.
25. See U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Vol 82, No 9, New York, 1977, pp 73-74.

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CUBA

'ARAFAT CONGRATULATES CASTRO ON UN SPEECH

PA182343 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1310 GMT 17 Oct 79 PA

[Text] Havana, 17 October (PL)--The Palestinian people's leader, Yasir 'Arafat, has said that the speech by President Fidel Castro at the 34th UN General Assembly was a historical one.

'Arafat sent Castro a message which was published today in GRANMA in a 2-column red box.

"The Palestinian people and their revolutionaries heard the historical speech given at the United Nations. We appreciate it greatly," the message says. It adds that Fidel defended the world's just causes, beginning with the Palestine people's problem.

It adds that it supported the inalienable right of the Palestine people to their land, to self-determination and to their own independent state.

Castro's attitude has the respect and admiration of our people, and we have always respected his revolutionary stand toward liberation movements, 'Arafat said.

Regarding the attainment of the rights of the people, these are based on principles which neither weaken nor bend, he said.

In your speech you showed your role as the vanguard, as president of the nonaligned countries, and as abiding by the great decisions taken in Havana, the Palestinian leader said. In the name of our people, of the Palestine Liberation Organization and in my own name, I wish you and the great Cuban people progress, well-being and victory over the enemies of the peoples--the imperialists, Zionists and their allies, 'Arafat said in his message.

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NICARAGUA

SOMOZA IN PARAGUAY TELLS OF RETURN PLANS

Hamburg STERN in German 13 Sep 79 pp 256-258

[Text] In his first interview after his escape, Nicaragua's ex-dictator Somoza revealed his return plans to STERN reporters Walter Unger and Perry Kretz.

The Villa Morra in Paraguay's capital Asuncion produces a pastoral effect on anyone passing by. Green is the lawn which separates the bungalow from the busy Avenida Mariscal Lopez, green are the palms and shrubs in the garden behind the house. At first glance a peaceful resting place for Anastasio Somoza, who after his escape from Nicaragua and his breathing spells in Florida, the Bahamas and Guatemala has found shelter here for the time being.

Green, however, are also the steel helmets which gleam between the bushes in the sun and which start to move when we are admitted into the house. And there he stands suddenly, the dictator ret. He beams at us, greets us by our first names and embraces us as though we were old friends. His face is cold and feverish-moist. But he gives the impression of being so lively, as if his world had not changes since the cocktail party to dedicate his new house in Managua, the last time that we met him in private.

Does he not know what we reported about him and his clan, which fleeced Nicaragua for 4 decades, about the terror practices of his military, about the bloodbath among the civilian population which he ordered at the end of his 12-year long reign?

He knows it. "But," he says, "you never played only the game of the communists who are now ruining my country, or the game of the blockheads in Washington who deceived me and did me in."

While sitting in the garden with us, which is separated from the neighboring properties by a wall of a man's height and is guarded by soldiers at all corners, he becomes increasingly furious in response to the question about his relationship to the big brother United States, who for so long supported him and his family.

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"I love America, and the Americans are good people," he said, and as he speaks his cadet ring from the West Point Military Academy with the engraved year of 1946 sparkles in the sun. "I have powerful friends in Congress in Washington. But then came Carter with his false human rights morality. He was and is a misfortune for me and my country. My friends in Congress understood that I needed help in the struggle against the communist danger which is threatening all of Latin America. The more they flexed their muscles for me, the more angrily this apostle Carter reacted."

Did Nicaragua not continue to receive economic and military aid during the Carter administration?

"Only credits. We paid for every weapon from the United States. And Carter had hardly entered office when he ordered a total stop of arms deliveries. So we ended up having to haggle even to get the weapons which had been contractually promised. This was a personal declaration of war by this bastard against me."

Somoza is getting so angry that his tie feels too tight. He disappears into the house. When he returns, he is wearing an open pink Dior shirt. But he is still gasping for breath because he is so furious: "It was not discontent and poverty in Nicaragua which forced me to resign, as is asserted throughout the world, but an international conspiracy, blessed by the greatest killer--Carter."

It is difficult to comprehend that he really believes in such nonsense.

We ask him what induced him nevertheless to go into exile in Florida and to put himself into the hands of this Carter.

"The agreement was clear. I resign and turn my office over to Francisco Urcuyo, who takes care of things only until the new government is formed. In return for this Washington guarantees me a safe place to stay--safe against extradition. The only condition was that I am no longer actively involved in politics. I kept my part of the agreement meticulously."

And why, then, did this Urcuyo suddenly not want to give up his office?

"I have nothing to do with that. My mistake was that I proposed him as successor. But Carter and his people immediately turned this into a trap for me. Warren Christopher, the U.S. deputy secretary of state for Latin America, called me and demanded that I bring Urcuyo to his senses. I explained to him that this is not my business. Thereupon they hinted in excellent diplomatic frankness that in that case Washington could not guarantee that a request for extradition on the part of the new rulers in Managua would in fact be turned down. In other words, first Carter did me in, then he deceived me on top of that."

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Would it not have been better had he listened to the advice of his generals and stepped down 2 years ago?

"Not a soul gave me such advice. And I would not have followed it. The only one who talked about giving up was my cook--and he did so only because the provisions were running low. That was 1 week before the end. All of us had believed that in the end Washington would come to its senses and would not allow the communists to set up housekeeping on the doorsteps of the United States. But that is Carter for you. In order to appear as human rights hero, he is stamping me as a dictator and permits an entire country to go to the dogs. A disgusting hypocrite. As long as he is in office, I could not breathe in the United States."

Now he is sitting in Paraguay, a country that is also not exactly famous as a bastion of freedom, which extended hospitality to the German Nazis, which has become the refuge of discharged presidents from Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia, and whose own president Alfredo Stroessner has just completed his 25th anniversary in office as dictator. Is the air here better for breathing?

Before answering, Somoza orders vodka--no longer, as once at home, American blend of vodka, but genuine Russian blend. "I am grateful to President Stroessner for the hospitality," he says routinely. After a pause, during which he strokes the coat of his Pekinese "Titi" and for a moment looks as if he were going to cry, he adds: "As you know, I am only renting this house, just like my predecessor, the ambassador of South Africa. My contract runs for 6 months. Nothing in this house belongs to me. I am living like a gypsy, and I don't know where I will finally stay. First of all I want to get some rest."

When Somoza fled to the United States in July, he arrived with a visa for 4 years, which identified him as an "industrialist." And, indeed, during his presidency he had worked in that capacity in actual fact and with a great deal of financial success. His domestic wealth, consisting of property in land and factories, was estimated at \$500 million in round figures. His possessions abroad, mostly in Florida, where his wife Hope, who lives separated from him, his cousin Luis Debayle and his girl friend Dinorah Sampson-Lagos reside, is valued at approximately the same sum. Does he have to worry about the future?

This subject again sends him into a rage. "I am not a poor man. But the figures which are being printed everywhere are lies. My possessions came to a total of \$100 million. I worked hard for this property and earned everything honestly. What is left to me is \$20 million, the rest was stolen by the communists. And I am anxious to see what kind of a republic they are going to make out of Nicaragua. If a law of justice really exists there, and not a law of weapons, they must return everything to me. I will fight for this."

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Anastasi Somoza says this, but he himself does not believe it. Just like a few weeks ago when he was huddling in his windowless bunker in Managua and talking confidently about the end of "some communist mischief-makers" in the near future, while his airplanes were destroying the cities and his guard members executed thousands of people, now in exile in Paraguay he is talking as though he had left his country only for a short holiday excursion. "The poor people in Nicaragua," he says, "will eventually learn what they have lost. They are still in a victorious mood, but when the time comes and they understand what a Cuban adventure the Sandinistas present to them, they will wish for my return."

In any case, he wants to go back. Back into politics as well? Somoza smiles: "No, I will not be a candidate, there are enough capable people in my liberal party. I will just be a farmer then."

While accompanying us to the gate with his son Anastasio, the ex-boss of the infamous National Guard, he laughs about the joke which is now making the rounds in Paraguay: Somoza is in the country in order to prepare himself for the succession of Alfredo Stroessner. Then he waves at us and shouts after us: "If you get to Nicaragua, give my people regards from the general."

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PERU

REPUBLICAN GUARDSMAN KILLS TWO ECUADOREAN FISHERMEN

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[Text] Quito, 2 Nov (DPA)--A member of the Republican Guard of Peru has shot and killed two Ecuadorean fishermen who were fishing in the Calvas River, in the municipality of Calvas, Loja Province. This took place on 26 October but did not become known in Quito until today.

According to the report filed by the daily EL MUNDO, of Loja, a Peruvian guard, Juan Portugal Rivera, is accused of having directed the attack against the two Ecuadoreans, Humberto Salazar and Indalecio Aguirre, while they were bathing and fishing with explosives in the Calvas River. The bodies were removed from the river and taken to Peruvian territory, to a site known as Ayabaca, according to investigations carried out by the police of Carimanga, Ecuador.

In El Playon on the border between the two countries, the chief of the police detachment there, Ciceron Calderon, confirmed the report on the death of the two Ecuadorean fishermen and indicated guard Juan Portugal was the person who had carried out the attack.

When the Quito Foreign Ministry was asked about this incident, it noted the deputy secretary of the Foreign Ministry's political office asked the acting Peruvian charge d'affaires to his office where he handed him a protest note demanding an immediate investigation on the part of Peruvian Government authorities and the returning of the bodies.

Two months ago there was another incident when a fisherman was shot in Ecuadorean sea waters by the crew of a Peruvian patrol boat. The fisherman, Juan Quinde, died. The Peruvian Government has admitted his widow is entitled to an indemnity.

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END

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